On 20 December 1776 Washington warned Congress that “ten days more will put an end to the existence of our Army”[1]. When most enlistments ran out at the end of the month, he expected to have fourteen to fifteen hundred effective men[6][15]. Within two weeks that army beat the British twice[10][20].
The enemy knew
The British held New Jersey with a chain of winter posts. Howe admitted the chain was “rather too extensive”, but judged his troops safe[23]. Colonel Johann Rall, at Trenton, was warned many times in writing[23][24].
Trenton
On Christmas night Washington crossed the Delaware above Trenton with about 2,400 men[21]. The ice made him hours late, but he “determined to push on at all Events”. The other two crossings, under Ewing and Cadwalader, failed[10]. On 26 December his column took Rall’s brigade, about 1,500 men. Twenty-three officers and 886 men surrendered, and went back over the river with him that day[10][23].
Paying the army to stay
On 27 December Cadwalader crossed anyway. By the 29th he was at Bordentown with about 1,800 men[26][12]. Washington crossed back into New Jersey too. But “Tomorrow the Continental Troops are all at Liberty,” he wrote to Robert Morris on 31 December[17].
He promised ten dollars a man to troops who would stay six weeks longer[15]. He did not have the money: “we have not Money to pay the Bounty, & we have exhausted our Credit”[17]. On 1 January Morris wrote that he was sending fifty thousand dollars[18].
On 30 December, in a letter meant to sway other regiments, Washington claimed that the New England regiments had “to a Man agreed”[15]. On 1 January he told Congress that “half or a greater proportion” had consented, after “the exertions of their Officers”. “The Troops felt their importance, and would have their price”[19].
At Crosswicks, a militia sergeant’s journal records General Mifflin persuading the New England men to stay[27]. The famous scene of Washington himself winning over silent ranks comes from a memoir written in 1832[30].
The Assunpink
By 1 January Lord Cornwallis had gathered the British at Princeton[23][24]. Washington held Trenton behind Assunpink Creek, the Delaware at his back, and Cadwalader and Mifflin brought about 3,600 more[20]. On 2 January Cornwallis marched down. Colonel Edward Hand’s riflemen delayed him until late afternoon[53][45][20]. The British tried to force the bridge, barely sixteen feet wide, and were driven back each time[21][26]. The sources used here give no reliable count of the losses[24][45].
Cornwallis decided to renew the attack in the morning[25]. The famous story of him boasting that he would catch Washington at dawn first appears in histories written decades later[34][35].
The night march
Washington saw that the enemy meant “to surround us”[20]. Cadwalader’s spy had brought a rough sketch of the road and found no sentries on the east side of Princeton[16]. Around midnight the army left its fires burning and guards at the bridge, and slipped away by a roundabout road to Princeton[20][23]. The ground had frozen hard for a march of about sixteen miles[26]. Washington said it “would avoid the appearance of a retreat”[20]. Even his men were in the dark: “no one knew what the Gen. meant to do,” wrote Captain Thomas Rodney[26].
Princeton
On the morning of 3 January, two British regiments under Lieutenant Colonel Mawhood were marching out of Princeton to join Cornwallis. They met General Hugh Mercer’s brigade by an orchard[26][51][23]. Mercer’s men broke. Mercer was mortally wounded, and died on 12 January[26][48]. Cadwalader’s militia came up and broke too[26][23].
Washington rode in and “exposed himself very much”, one officer wrote[23]. Rodney credits Washington with rallying both brigades, and the British line gave way[26]. Henry Knox wrote that the enemy were “as much astonished as if an army had dropped perpendicularly upon them”[23]. British losses are disputed. By most counts they were a few hundred, mostly prisoners[21][23][47].
After
Washington thought of striking the British stores at Brunswick, but his men were exhausted. He gave it up, fearing “the danger of loosing the advantage we had gained by aiming at too much”[20]. The British fell back toward Brunswick in haste[24]. Knox wrote: “The enemy were within nineteen miles of Philadelphia, they are now sixty miles”[23]. On 20 January Howe admitted that Trenton “has thrown us further back than was at first apprehended”[23].